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The Complexity of Stochastic Games 
ANNE CONDON* 
Computer Sciences Department, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 
1210 West Da.vton Street, Madison, Wisconsin 53706 
We consider the complexity of stochastic games-simple games of chance played 
by two players. We show that the problem of deciding which player has the greatest 
chance of winning the game is in the class NP n co-NP. 0 1992 Academic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
We consider the complexity of a natural combinatorial problem, that of 
deciding the outcome of a special kind of stochastic game. A simple 
stochastic game (SSG) is a directed graph with three types of vertices, 
called max, min, and average vertices. There are a special start vertex and 
two special sink vertices, called the O-sink and the l-sink. For simplicity, we 
assume that all vertices have exactly two (not necessarily distinct) 
neighbors, except for the sink vertices, which have no neighbors. 
The graph models a game between two players, 0 and 1. In the game, a 
token is initially placed on the start vertex, and at each step of the game 
the token is moved from a vertex to one of its neighbors, according to the 
following rules: At a min vertex, player 0 chooses the neighbor to which 
the token is moved. At a max vertex, player 1 chooses the neighbor to 
which the token is moved. At an average vertex, a coin is tossed to deter- 
mine where the token is moved, so that it is moved to each neighbor of the 
average vertex with probability 4. 
The game ends when the token reaches a sink vertex; player 1 wins if it 
reaches the l-sink vertex and player 0 wins otherwise, that is, if the token 
reaches the O-sink vertex or if the game never halts. The reason for the 
names max and min vertices is that at the max vertices, player 1 chooses 
its move to maximize the probability of eventually reaching the l-sink 
vertex, whereas at the min vertices, player 0 chooses its move so as to 
minimize the probability of reaching the l-sink vertex. 
Informally, a strategy for player 0 (1) is a rule that defines what move 
the player takes whenever the token is at a min (max) vertex. There are 
two natural questions to ask about a simple stochastic game: 
* Supported by National Science Foundation Grant DCR-8802736. 
203 
0890-X01/92 $3.00 
Copyright 0 1992 by Academic Press, Inc. 
All rights of reproductwn in any form reserved. 
204 ANNECONDON 
(i) what are the best strategies of the players; and 
(ii) what is the probability that player 1 wins the game, if both 
players use their best strategies. 
Although many algorithms that answer these questions have been 
studied, none run in polynomial time. Thus the natural decision problem 
associated with these questions-that of deciding if the probability that 
player 1 wins is greater than $-is not known to be in P. The purpose of 
this paper is not to describe new algorithms for this problem, but instead 
to formulate the important questions in a complexity-theoretic framework. 
We show that this decision problem is in NPn co-NP. Although many 
number theoretic problems not known to be in P lie in the class 
NP n co-NP, combinatorial problems that lie between P and NP n co-NP 
are rare. The stochastic game problem defined in this paper is an 
interesting example of a simple combinatorial problem with this property. 
The study of stochastic games was initiated by Shapley (1953) and many 
variations of the model have been investigated since then (see Peters and 
Vrieze, 1987, for a survey). The class of stochastic games studied in this 
paper is somewhat similar to the class of stochastic games with switching 
transitions, studied by Filar (1981). We were motivated to study these 
simple stochastic games while considering the power of the following com- 
plexity model: space bounded alternating Turing machines, generalized to 
allow random as well as universal and existential moves. (Alternating 
Turing machines are described in Chandra et al., 198 1.) A polynomial time 
algorithm for the simple stochastic game problem would imply that adding 
randomness to space bounded alternating Turing machines does not 
increase the class of languages they accept. 
In Section 2, we give a more precise definition of the stochastic game 
problem considered in the paper and describe properties of stochastic 
games. In Section 3, we show that the decision problem associated with 
these questions lies in the class NP n co-NP. We also describe some special 
cases where the problem can be solved in polynomial time, namely when 
the graph is restricted to have just two of the three types of vertices max, 
min, and average. In Section 4, we briefly describe variations of the SSG 
model and examine their complexity, and list some open problems. 
2. DEFINITIONS AND PROPERTIES OF SIMPLE STOCHASTIC GAMES 
In this section, we define precisely the model of stochastic games 
considered in this paper. We describe some basic properties of strategies 
of the players of such games. Many of the results presented here have 
previously appeared in the literature of stochastic games; we include them 
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for completeness and because in some cases they can be simplified of 
strengthened for the special class of games studied in this paper. 
2.1. Definitions 
A simple stochastic game (SSG) is a directed graph G = (V, E) with the 
following properties. The vertex set V is the union of disjoint sets V,,,, 
Vmin 3 Kverage 3 called max, min and average vertices, together with two 
special vertices, called the O-sink and the l-sink. One vertex of V is called 
the start vertex. Each vertex of V has two outgoing edges, except the sink 
vertices, which have no outgoing edges. Without loss of generality, assume 
that the vertices of G are numbered 1,2, . . . . n, with n - 1 and n being the 
0- and l-sink vertices, respectively. An example of a SSG is given in Fig. 1. 
Associated with the game are two players, 0 and 1. A strategy z of player 
0 is a set of edges of E, each with its left end at a min vertex, such that for 
each min vertex i there is exactly one edge (i, j) in r. Informally, if (i, j) E z 
then in a game where player 0 uses strategy t, the token is always moved 
from vertex i to vertex j. Similarly, a strategy cr of player 1 is a set of edges 
of E, each with its left end at a max vertex such that for each max vertex 
i there is exactly one edge (i, j) in g. In the game theory literature, 
strategies satisfying this definition are called pure stationary strategies 
because (i) the players do not use probabilistic choice in choosing a move, 
and (ii) each player chooses the same move from a vertex every time that 
vertex is reached. We only consider pure stationary strategies in this paper 
because, as we will see later, both players of a SSG have optimal strategies 
of this type. (For a discussion of other types of strategies, see Peters and 
Vrieze, 1987.) 
Corresponding to strategy (T is a graph G,, which is the subgraph of G 
obtained by removing from each max vertex the outgoing edge that is not 
in the strategy cr. Similarly, corresponding to a pair of strategies (T and z, 
is a graph G,, ~ obtained from G, by removing from each min vertex the 
FIG. 1. A simple stochastic game with 10 vertices. Vertex 1 is the start vertex. 
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outgoing edge that is not in r. In G, z, every max and min vertex has one 
outgoing edge. Thus G, r can be considered as a Markov process where the 
states of the process are the vertices of G and the transition probabilities 
pij, 1 <i, j<n, are defined as follows. If id n - 1 then pv = i if i is an 
average vertex with outgoing edge (1, j); p,- = 1 if i is a max or min vertex 
with outgoing edge (i, j), and pv = 0 otherwise. Since n - 1 and n are sink 
states, we define p,,,, =pnPInP1=l,pnj=Oifj#nandp,_r,=Oifj#n-1. 
We say a SSG halts with probability 1 if for all pairs of strategies cr, z, every 
vertex in G, ~ has a path to a sink vertex. 
We define the value u, ,(i) of each vertex i of G with respect to strategies 
~7 and r to be the probability that player 1 wins the game if the start vertex 
is i and the players use strategies CJ and r. That is, the value u,,,(i) is the 
probability of reaching the l-sink vertex from the start vertex on a random 
walk of the Markov process G,, r, starting from vertex i. In Fig. 2, the sub- 
graph of the SSG of Fig. 1 is given, for strategies (T = { (1, 5), (3,4), (6, 7)) 
and r = { (4, 3)) of player 1 and 0, respectively. 
Without loss of generality, assume that the vertices of G,, ~ are numbered 
so that { 1, . . . . t} is the set of vertices from which a sink vertex is reachable, 
other than the sink vertices themselves. Then clearly the values u,,,(i), 
1 < i < n satisfy the following conditions: If t < i < n - 1 then u,, ,(i) = 0 and 
u,,,(n) = 1; otherwise 
30,. ,(A + 0,. .(k)), if i is an average vertex of G, r 
with outgoing edges (i, j), (i, k), 
u,, ,U) = 
I 
(1) 
0,. ,(A, if i is a max or a min vertex of G,, T 
with outgoing edge (i, j). 
We next show that the equations (I) have a unique solution. 
r 
FIG. 2. Subgraph of the SSG of Fig. 1, for strategies g = { (1, 5), (3,4), (6, 7)) and 
7 = { (4, 3)} of player 1 and 0, respectively. The value v,, T (i) of each vertex i is given above 
the vertex. 
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LEMMA 1. Let G be a SSG with n vertices and let o and z be strategies 
of players 1 and 0, respectively. Suppose that the vertices of G,,, are 
numbered so that the set of vertices (other than the sink vertices) from 
which a sink vertex is reachable is exactly the set { 1, . . . . t} and let 
fi,,T = (v,, ,(I ), ***, 0,. T (t)). Then there are an t x t matrix Q and a t-vector 6 
with entries in (0, 4, 1 } such that 6,. i is the unique solution to the equation 
60, z = Qv,, ~ + 6. Also I - Q is invertible, all entries of (I- Q) ~ ’ are 
non-negative, and the entries along the diagonal are strictly positive. 
Proof Substituting 0 for v,,,(i), t + 1 6 i6 n - 1 and 1 for v,, Jn) in 
Eqs. (1) and rearranging the terms in the equations, it follows that 
5,. r = Qtic. T + 6, 
where 6 is a constant vector and Q is the l-step transition matrix of the 
vertices { 1, . . . . t}. For each i, the ith component of b is from the set 
(0, i, l} and equals the probability of reaching the l-sink vertex from i in 
1 step. Also all entries of Q are in { 0, i, 1 }. The equation 6, ~ = QU,, ~ + b 
has a unique solution if and only if (I- Q) is invertible. 
To prove that (I- Q) is invertible, we first show that lim,, m Q’= 0. We 
show that for any m > 1, the sum of the terms in any row of Q”” is at most 
(1 - l/2”)“. Since all terms of Q’ are non-negative for any 1, it follows from 
this that as l+ 00, Q’ + 0. Note that the ijth entry of Q”” is the probability 
of reaching vertex j from vertex i in exactly mn steps. When m is 1, the sum 
of the terms of the ith row of Q”” is at most 1 minus the probability of 
reaching a sink vertex of G, r from i in n steps. Since a sink vertex is 
reachable from i, there must be a path of length <n in G, ~ from i to a 
sink. Hence the probability of reaching a sink from i in n steps is at least 
l/2”. Therefore, the sum of the terms in any row of Q” is at most 1 - l/2”. 
The proof for m > 1 is an easy induction argument. 
Since lim,, m Q’= 0, 1 cannot be an eigenvalue of Q. Hence I- Q 
is invertible. In fact, since Z-Q’=(Z-Q)(Z+Q+Q’+ . . . +Q’-I), 
multiplying both sides by (Z-Q)-’ we get that 
(Z-Q)-'(I-Q',=Z+Q+Q'+ ... +Q'-'. 
Again, since lim, _ o. Q’= 0, the limit of the left hand side of this 
equation is (I- Q) - ‘; hence the limit of the right hand side must exist and 
(I-Q)-‘=Z+Q+Q’+ . . . . Hence every entry of (I- Q)- l is non- 
negative and the entries along the diagonal are strictly positive. 1 
We define the value of the game G to be 
m;x mjn v,, ,(start). 
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Informally, the value of the game is the maximum probability that player 
1 wins if it reveals its best strategy to player 0 at the start of the game, and 
player 0 plays its best strategy against the strategy chosen by player 1. 
Given a SSG, a natural question is: what is its value? A related problem 
is to find the best strategies of the players, that is, the strategies e and r 
such that the value of the game equals u,,(start). To investigate the com- 
plexity of these problems, we consider the following decision problem for 
SSGs. 
The SSG value problem is: Given a SSG, is its value > $? 
In Section 3, we show that this decision problem is in the class 
NPn co-NP. To build up to the proof, we describe many interesting 
properties of simple stochastic games in Section 2.2. 
2.2. Properties of Simple Stochastic Games 
We next describe some properties of the value and of the strategies of 
simple stochastic games. We first show that the value of a SSG is a rational 
number of the form p/q where 0 d p, q < 4”. From this, it is possible to 
bound the value of a SSG away from i if it is not equal to -$. In the 
succeeding lemmas, we build up to the proof that both players possess 
“optimal” strategies-strategies that are guaranteed to ensure that the out- 
come of the game is the best possible for that player, regardless of what the 
other player does or what the start vertex is. Finally in Lemma 6 we 
describe a strong form of the minimax theorem for simple stochastic games. 
LEMMA 2. The value of a simple stochastic game G with n vertices is of 
the form p/q, where p and q are integers, 0 6 p, q 6 4” ~ I. 
Proof. The proof of this lemma is very similar to a proof by Gill 
(1977, Lemma 6.6). Let 0 and r be arbitrary strategies of players 0 and 1, 
respectively. Then the value of O-valued vertices and the l-sink vertex with 
respect to strategies rr and r can be written as O/l and l/l, respectively, and 
so are clearly of the form given in the lemma. Without loss of generality, 
assume that all of the vertices with a path to a sink vertex, excluding the 
sink vertices, are numbered from 1 to t and let V, I = (a,, ,(l), . . . . v,, ,(t)). In 
Lemma 1 it was shown that V, T is the unique solution to the equation 
2(Z- Q) V,, ~ = 26, where b is a constant vector and I- Q is a matrix with 
non-zero determinant. Furthermore, the entries in 2(Z- Q) and 26 are from 
the set (0, +l, 52). By Cramer’s rule, the value of a vertex ig { 1,2, . . . . t> 
can be represented as the quotient of two integers NJD, where D is the 
determinant of 2(Z- Q) and Ni is the determinant of the matrix obtained 
by replacing the ith column of 2(Z- Q) by 26. The determinant of 2(Z- Q) 
is at most 4’. To prove this, we use the following property of 2(Z- Q): 
COMPLEXITYOFGAMES 209 
Each row of 2(Z- Q) h as a constant number of non-zero 
entries from the set (0, &l, +2}, whose absolute values 
sum to at most 4. (*) 
We show by induction on t that any t x t matrix A with property (*) has 
determinant at most 2’. If t = 1, the determinant is at most 2. If t > 1, then 
by the induction hypothesis, the absolute value of the determinant of any 
minor of A is at most 4’- I. This is because the minors of A also have 
property (*). Hence the determinant of A is at most 4’- ’ times the sum of 
the absolute values of the entries in the first row of A. This product is at 
most 4’, again applying property (*). 
Thus D is at most 4’ 6 4”- ‘, since t < n. Also, since the value of each 
vertex is at most 1, the value of each Ni is an integer <D. Thus the value 
of each vertex of G, ~ is the quotient of two numbers, each of value at most 
4”- ‘. In particular this is true for the start vertex of G, 7. 
Since the strategies g and z were chosen arbitrarily, max, min, u,, ,(start) 
must be the quotient of two numbers, each of value at most 4”- ‘. 1 
LEMMA 3. Zj’ the value of a simple stochastic game with n vertices is 
> l/2, then it is > l/2 + l/4”. 
ProoJ From Lemma 2, the value of a simple stochastic game with n 
vertices is of the form p/q where p and q are integers, 0 <p, q <4”- ‘. If 
p/q > l/5 then 2p > q + 1. Hence, 
In the following lemmas, we describe properties of optimal strategies of 
the players of a SSG. For simplicity, we only consider SSGs that halt with 
probability 1 in the rest of this section. (Recall that a SSG halts with 
probability 1 if on all pairs of strategies 0, r, a sink vertex is reachable from 
every vertex of G,, ,). We first show that for each strategy (T of player 1, 
there is a strategy $0) of player 0 that is “optimal” with respect to (r in 
that for every min vertex i of G, the value of i with respect to strategies 0, 
z(g) equals the minimum of the values of its children. We call r(a) an 
optimal strategy of player 0 with respect to strategy C. 
LEMMA 4 (Howard, 1960). Let G be a simple stochastic game with n 
vertices that halts with probability 1 and let 0 be any strategy of player 1. 
Then there is some strategy T(G) such that for each vertex ie Vmin with 
neighbors j and k, 
0,. ,di) = minCv,, ,,,,(A v,, ,~#)I. 
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Proof Howard (1960) described an algorithm to construct r(a) 
satisfying the lemma. The algorithm proceeds in iterations. There is a 
current strategy z(q) for each iteration q; the current strategy of the initial 
iteration is chosen arbitrarily and is denoted by r(0). Strategy z(q + 1) is 
constructed from strategy z(q) by finding any one vertex in Vmin with 
neighbors j, k such that (i, j) E s(q) but r,, Tcqj(k) < u,. r,yj(j) and replacing 
(i, j) by (i, k). If no such vertex exists, the algorithm halts. The current 
strategy of the final iteration is 7(a). From the construction of t(a), it must 
be the case that for each vertex i E Vmin with neighbors j and k, u,, =,,,(i) = 
minb, rc,,(A, u,, ,,&)I. 
To prove that Howard’s algorithm is correct, it remains to show that it 
always halts. To simplify the notation in the proof, let u,(i) = u,, z,,,,(i). The 
fact that Howard’s algorithm halts follows from the following property, 
which we will prove: if the algorithm does not halt at round q then strategy 
z(q + 1) improves strategy t(q) in that for each vertex I of G, u, + ,(1) < u,(l) 
and for at least one vertex the inequality is strict. This ensures that no 
strategy can be repeated in the sequence r(O), t(l), . . . . r(a). Since there are 
only a finite number of strategies (at most 2”) for player 1, the sequence is 
finite. 
Clearly, for the 0- and l-sink vertices, which are numbered n - 1 and n, 
O=u,+,(n-l)=v,(n-1) and l=u,+, (n) = u,(n). Therefore we restrict 
our attention to the vertices numbered 1, . . . . n - 2. Let t =n - 2. Let 
fiq < (u,( 11, . ..? u,(t))=. As in Lemma 1 let matrices Qy, Q,, , and vectors 6, 
and 6,+, be such that V,=Q,V,+6, and Vy+,=Qy+1Uq+1+6y+,. Let 
J=Uq-Uq+l. We show that d > 0 and that some entry is actually >O. 
Adding and subtracting Q,, i Uy + 6,+ ,to 2 we see that 
d=(Q,v,+b,)-(Q,+,v,+b,+,)+(Q,+l~,+6,+,) 
-(Q y+1fiy+1+h4+1). 
IfS=(Q,fi,+6,)-(Q,+,Vq+6q+,), then a=Q,+,J+& From Lemma 1 
it follows that the matrix (I- Q, + i ) is invertible, since G halts with 
probability 1. Hence a= (Z-Q,,, ) -’ 6. Also from Lemma 1, all the 
entries of (I- Q,, i)-’ are 20 and the entries along the diagonal are >O. 
Therefore, it remains to show that 53 0 and that one entry is actually > 0. 
Suppose edge (i, k) replaces (i, j) in the construction of z(q + 1) from z(q). 
Hence Q4 and Q,, i differ in at most the ith row and similarly 6, and b,, 1 
differ in at most the ith row. Thus every entry of S must be 0, except 
possibly the ith entry. 
Moreover, the ith entries of Q4U4+ 6, and Q,, ,Uq+bq+, are u,(j) and 
v,(k), respectively; hence the ith entry of S is u,(j) - u,(k). Since edge (i, k) 
replaces (i, j) in the construction of r(q + 1) from z(q), it must be the case 
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that o,(j) > v,(k) and hence the ith entry of C? must be >O. This completes 
the proof that Howard’s algorithm halts. 1 
The next lemma shows that in any SSG G that halts with probability 1, 
player 1 has a strategy 0’ which is optimal in the following sense. Suppose 
player 0 uses some optimal strategy z(rr’) with respect to strategy 0’. Then 
for each vertex i E V,,,, the value of i with respect to strategies 6’ and $a’) 
is the maximum of the values of its children. We call any such pair of 
strategies (J’, t’= ~(0’) an optimal pair of strategies. The proof of this 
lemma is a straightforward extension of Lemma 4; similar proofs for other 
classes of stochastic games are surveyed in (Peters and Vrieze, 1987). 
LEMMA 5. Let G be a simple stochastic game with n vertices that halts 
with probability 1. Then there is a strategy o’ of player 1 such that, for some 
optimal strategy z’=z(a’) of player 0 with respect to strategy of, for all 
vertices i E V,,, with neighbors j and k, 
u,,, di) = maxCv,,, Ai), u,,, @)I. 
Proof: Again the strategy rs’ can be found by an iterative method 
similar to Lemma 4. In the iterative algorithm to construct cr’, there is a 
current strategy o(q) for each iteration q; the current strategy for the initial 
iteration is chosen arbitrarily. Let z(q) be an optimal strategy of player 0 
with respect to strategy o(q). Such a strategy can be found using the algo- 
rithm of Lemma 4. Let v,(l) denote v,,(~), i(,,(l). Strategy a(q + 1) is 
constructed from strategy o(q) by finding any one vertex iE V,,, such that 
(i. j) E a(q) but v,(k) > vq( j) and replacing (i, j) by (i, k). If no such vertex 
exists the algorithm halts; the current strategy of the final iteration is c+. 
Let t’ be an optimal strategy of player 0 with respect to 0’. From this 
construction, it must be the case that for each vertex ig V,,, with 
neighbors j and k, v,,, ,,(i) = max[v,,, ,(j), vO,, .(k)]. 
As in Lemma 4, to show that the iterative algorithm halts, it is sufficient 
to show that v,, 1(l) 3 v,(l) and that the inequality is strict for some 1. The 
proof of this is complicated by the fact that at each iteration, both o(q) and 
z(q) are being changed, whereas in the construction of Lemma 4 only one 
strategy is changed. However, the key elements in the proof are similar. 
Suppose that (i, k) replaces (i, j) in the construction of a(q + 1) from 
a(q) and that (i’. k’) replaces (i’, j’) in the construction of t(q + 1) from 
z(q). We restrict the proof to the case where z(q + 1) and z(q) differ in only 
one edge; the proof can easily be generalized to the case when they differ 
in more than one edge. 
Again, it is immediate that vq+ ,(l) 3 v,(l) for I= n - 1 or n. Therefore, we 
consider the vertices 1, . . . . t, where t =n - 2. Let Vs = (v,(l), . . . . v,(t))=, 
uq+1= (~,+~(l),...,v~+~(f))~, fiq=Qqfiq+bqy andv,+,=Q,+,u,+,+6,+, 
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for some Qq, Q,, , , Fy, and b,, , . As in Lemma 4, it follows that if 
J=v,+,-v y, then d=(I-Q,+,)-‘6, where 6=(Q,+,1?~+6~+,)- 
( Q4U4 + 6,). Also (I- Qy + , ) - i has positive entries along the diagonal and 
all entries are non-negative. So it remains to show that 83 0 and that some 
entry is >O. 
As in Lemma 4, it can be shown that the ith entry of 6 is >O and that 
if I# i’ and I # i, the Ith entry of 8 is 0. It remains to consider S(i’). 
Since z(q) is optimal with respect to o(q) and (i’, j’)E t(q), it must be 
the case that v,(j’) 6 o&k’). But the i’th entries of Q,, i U4 + b4+ 1 and 
Q4fi4 + b, are u&k’) and v,(j’), respectively. Hence the i’th entry of 6 is 
u&k’) - u,(j’) z 0, as required. 1 
Recall that we defined the value of a SSG G to be max, min, u, ,(start). 
In fact, it is equivalent to switch the order of max and min quantifiers in 
this definition. In the next lemma, we show that both the max-min and the 
min-max definitions are equivalent, for SSGs that halt with probability 1. 
The proof is a straightforward application of the techniques of the 
preceding lemmas. Similar results have been proved for many types of 
stochastic games (see Peters and Vrieze, 1987), but this result is stronger 
than others because of our restriction to pure strategies of the players. 
LEMMA 6. Let G be any simple stochastic game that halts with 
probability 1. Then for any vertex 1 of G, 
mm m;x u,, ,(I) = rnfx mm a,, .( 1). 
ProoJ It follows immediately that max, min, u,, ,(I) < min, max, u,, ,(I). 
To prove the other direction, let max, min, u,, ,(I) = u,,.,.(I), where 0’ and 
r’ are optimal strategies. Note that we can assume that e’ and r’ are 
optimal based on the proofs of Lemmas 4 and 5. The proof is completed 
once we show that 
mm max u,, ,(1) < max u,,,.(I) < u,,.,.(I). Lr n 
The first inequality is straightforward, so we show that max, u,. ,.(1) d 
u,,.,(Z). Fix any strategy cr of player 1. Clearly the statement is true if I is 
a sink node, so suppose 1~ n - 1. Let t = n - 2, let 6, rI = (u,, ..(1), . . . . u,, Jt))’ 
and V,,,, TI = (u,, ,(l), . . . . u,,,,,(t))? Let V,, rI = QU,, rI + 6, where Q and 6 
satisfy the conditions of Lemma 1. 
Then we claim that V,., TI > QU,,, TI + 6. This is because if i is not a max 
vertex, the ith component of both sides of the inequality are equal; if i is 
a max vertex, the value of the left hand side is the maximum of the values 
of its neighbors whereas the value of the right hand side is one of these 
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neighbors. Finally, since I- Q is invertible and all entries of (I- Q)) ’ 
are 20, V,,, *, > (I- Q))’ 6 = 6,. 1I. In particular, u,,,,.(f) 2 V,,,(Z), as 
required. g 
Let Uopt be the n-vector whose ith component is max, min, u,,,(Z). We 
call Vopt the value vector of G. We complete this section with some observa- 
tions about optimal strategies and the vector 17,~~. For any SSG G, let I, 
be the function I,: [0, 11” -+ [0, 11” (written simply as Z if there is no 
ambiguity about which graph is meant), defined as I,(.?) = I, where 
I 
max{.W, x(k)), if i is a max vertex of G with neighbors j, k, 
min{W, -4k)), if i is a min vertex of G with neighbors j, k, 
y(i) = $(.x(j) +x(k)), if i is an average vertex of G with neighbors j, k, 
0, ifi=n-- 1, 
1, if i = n. 
We call the set of vectors z for which Z= Z(Z) the solutions of G. Then 
from Lemma 5, it is straightforward to show that if G is a SSG that halts 
with probability 1, then for any pair of optimal strategies (T’, r’, the vector 
is a ~,i;B”,‘z;4’,‘,‘;b~~~(~~~~ v solution of G. From this it follows that if 
9 opt = O,., il, for any pair of optimal strategies 
o’, r’. 
3. COMPLEXITY RESULTS 
In this section we show that the SSG value problem is in NP n co-NP. 
We will use the fact that if G has a unique solution, the value vector Uopt 
of G equals this solution. Moreover, given a vector Z it is easy to check that 
it is a solution of G. These facts form the basis of the proof that the SSG 
problem is in NP n co-NP. Roughly, if a game G has a unique solution, 
then a nondeterministic algorithm can guess the solution and it can be 
deterministically checked if the value of the start vertex in that solution is 
greater than $. In general, however, the solution of a simple stochastic 
game may not be unique. 
Therefore, we show that in a time polynomial in the size of an SSG G, 
we can construct from G a new game G’ such that G’ has a unique solution 
and the value of G’ > 4 if and only if the value of G > $. The new game G’ 
is called a stopping SSG because it halts with probability 1; this fact will 
be used to prove that G’ has a unique solution. (The term “stopping 
stochastic game” was introduced by Shapley (1953). Stopping games are 
also known as discounted stochastic games). 
For any integer m > 0, a stopping SSG G’ is obtained from an arbitrary 
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SSG G as follows. G’ contains all the vertices (1, 2, . . . . n} of G (where as 
usual, n - 1 and n are the 0- and l-sink vertices) and in addition, for every 
edge e of G, G’ contains a set of average vertices {e, , ez, . . . . e,}. None of 
the original edges of G are in G’; instead, for each edge e = (i, j) of G, the 
following set of edges is included in G’: {(i, e,). (e,, e,), (ez, e3), . . . . 
(em-,, 4, (e,, n- 11, (e,, A, (e,, A, . . . . (em, A). 
From this construction, note that if a path is followed from vertex i, the 
first vertex from the set { 1, . . . . n} that is reached is either vertex j or vertex 
n - 1 (the O-sink); and this vertex is reached in at most m + 1 steps. There- 
fore, with probability l/2” the O-sink is the first vertex from the set 
{ 1, . . . . n} that is reached on a random walk from i. If the O-sink vertex is 
reached, the game ends. The resulting stopping game is called a 
l/2”-stopping game because at any step of the game, from any vertex in the 
set { 1, . . . . n}, the probability of ending the game before reaching another 
vertex in the set { 1, . . . . n - 2) is at least l/2”. 
Shapley (1953) showed that any stopping game constructed in this 
manner has a unique solution; we include the proof here for completeness. 
LEMMA 7 (Shapley, 1953). rf G’ is a l/2”-stopping game corresponding 
to G then G’ has a unique solution. 
Proof Suppose that G has n vertices. By definition, for any solution Z 
of G, Z= Z(Z). Assume that the vertices numbered 1, . . . . n in G’ are the 
vertices that are also in G. First, note that the values of the new average 
vertices of G’, that is, the vertices not in { 1, ..,, n}, are uniquely determined 
by the values of the vertices in the set (1, . . . . n}. Hence if P+ and X are 
distinct solutions of G’, they must differ in at least one of their first n 
components, i.e., w(i) # x(i) for some i < n. Also if Z’ is a solution of G’ then 
for m>O and 1 <i<n-2, 
z’(i) = (1 - 1/2”)(Z,(Z’))(i). 
This can be proven easily by induction on m. Intuitively it is true for value 
vectors z’ of G’ because if i has children j and k in G, then in the game G’, 
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with probability l/2”, the game ends before the token is moved from i to 
j or k. 
Now suppose to the contrary that the vectors W and X are two distinct 
solutions of G’. We show that this leads to a contradiction. In the rest of 
this proof, let IlW--Xll =max,,i<,, Iw(i)-x(i)/ =c>O. Then /lW-X]l = 
(1 - l/2”) Ill(W) - Z(X)ll. More%&, it is straightforward to show that 
Ill(W) - Z(X)/1 <c, since for each i, 1 < i < n - 2 with neighbors j and k, if 
Z(W)(i) denotes the ith component of Z(W) then 
I(Z(@))(d- U(4)(4 
i 
Imax(4jL WI) -maxHi), x(k))l, if in V,,,, 
= Imin(w(j), w(k)) -min(x( j), x(k))l, if in Vmin, 
fdw(j) + w(k)) - bC) + -4k)), if i E Gaverage. 
If I w( i) - x( i)l < c for 1 < i < n - 2 then each of these differences is also d c. 
We have now shown that 
a contradiction. Hence the stopping game G’ has a unique solution. 1 
The last step to proving the main theorem is completed in the next 
lemma, where it is shown that the value of a SSG is >$ if and only if the 
value of the corresponding (l/2’“)-stopping game is > 4, for some constant 
c > 0. This lemma is a discrete version of a result of Filar (1981) who 
proved that the value of G is the limit, as b-0, of the value of the 
P-stopping game corresponding to G. 
LEMMA 8. There is a constant c> 0, such that if G is a SSG with n 
vertices, the value of G is > i if and only if the value of the corresponding 
(l/2’“)-stopping game is > +. 
ProojI One direction of this proof is straightforward; it is not hard to 
see that the stopping SSG corresponding to any SSG must have lower 
value. Hence if the value of G < 1 it must be the case that the value of any 
/I-stopping game is Q 4. 
Let G’ be the P-stopping SSG corresponding to G for some /I = l/2’” and 
let 6’ be the value vector of G’. Since G and G’ have the same number of 
max and min vertices, there is a l-l correspondence between the strategies 
of both games. We show that for any pair of strategies c and t of the 
players, for any iE { 1, . . . . n>, the values of i with respect to CJ and r in 
games G and G’ are close. Specifically, for any vertex iE { 1, . . . . n - 2}, 
v,,.(i) - 4, ,(i) < l/4” f or sufficiently large c. Then from Lemma 2, if the 
value of G is greater than i then so is the value of G’. 
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From the construction of G’ from G, it is easy to verify that the same 
vertices from the set { 1, . . . . n - 2) have non-zero value in graphs G,, T, CL, T. 
Let these vertices be 1, . . . . t; let U,, i = (u,, ,(l), . . . . t’,,,(t)) and 6; ~ = 
(4, ,(I 1, . . . . ob. ,(l)). Let fi,. T = QC,, ~ + b be the equation uniquely defining 
the values IJ,, ,(i), 1 < i < t. A gain from the construction of G’ it follows that 
--I 
V 0. I =(l+)QV:,,+(1+)6. 
Since Q is invertible, 2;,, I = (I-Q))‘6=6 C;*=, Q’. Similarly, V&,,= 
d C,?‘f= o ( 1 - /?),‘+ ’ Qj. Hence 
v,, ~ - v, T* =b jzo (1 -(I -P))‘+‘) Q’, and so 
ll%-Lll~j~o (1-(1-B))‘+‘) IIQ’II. 
Rewriting (1 - (1 - B)j+ ’ ) as a telescoping sum, it follows that it can be 
bounded above by p(j + 1). To get an upper bound on IIt?,, ~ - V,, 7I 11, we 
also need a bound on the rate of convergence of II Qiil to 0 as j + cc. In the 
proof of Lemma 1, we showed that for all integers m 2 0, II Qflml/ < 
(1 - l/2”)“. From this it follows that 
‘K 
IIV,, T - v,, r./I < c fl(j + 1 )( 1 - l/2”)“‘” d B23n, 
j=O 
for sufficiently large n. For an appropriate choice of the constant c (say, 
c=5), if /I= l/2” then lIti,,--V,,,. II < l/4”. By Lemma 3, it follows that if 
V,, Jstart) > : then V, ,(start) > $. 
In particular, if 0’ and z’ are the optimal strategies of players 1 and 0, 
respectively, given by Lemma 5, U,,, Jstart) > 1 implies that fib., ,(start) > $. 
Therefore, the value of G is > 4 if and only if the value of G’ is > $. 1 
THEOREM 1. The SSG value problem is in NP n co-NP. 
Prooj We first describe a nondeterministic Turing machine M that on 
input a SSG G with n vertices, accepts if and only if G has value > $. M 
constructs the l/2’“-stopping game G’ corresponding to G, where c is the 
constant of Lemma 8, and then guesses a vector YE [0, l]“, where each 
component of z is rational. It then verifies that the vector 2 is a solution 
of G’. If so and if the value of the start vertex is > i then M accepts; else 
M rejects. From Lemma 8, M accepts G if and only if the value of G is > 1. 
A similar construction shows that the complement of the SSG value 
problem is in NP. A nondeterministic machine li;i, given a SSG G as input, 
constructs the l/2’“-stopping game G’ corresponding to G, where c is the 
constant of Lemma 8 and then guesses a vector ZE [0, 11”. where each 
component of Z is rational. It then verities that the vector Z is a solution 
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of G’. If so and if the value of the start vertex is <i then R accepts; else 
li;i rejects. 1 
To complete this section, we prove that special cases of the SSG value 
problem are actually in P. 
THEOREM 2. The SSG value problem restricted to SSGs with just (1) 
average and max vertices, or (2) average and min vertices, or (3) max and 
min vertices can be solved in polynomial time. 
Proof: The proof for case (1) is due to Derman (1972). Let G = ( l’, E) 
be an SSG with n vertices. From Lemma 8 we assume that G is a stopping 
game, so that G has a unique solution. We claim that the solution of G is 
the optimal solution to the following linear programming problem: 
minimize C;=, v(l), subject to the constraints 
v(i) 2 24 j) if i is a max vertex and (i, j) E E 
v(i) 3 t(u(j) + v(k)) if i is an average vertex and (i, j), (i, j) E E 
v(i) = 0 ifi=n-1 
v(i) = 1 if i=n 
v(i) Z 0 16i6n. 
Let V= (v(l), v(2), . . . . v(n)) be the optimal solution to the linear 
programming problem. We first show that it must be the solution of the 
SSG G. Otherwise, one of two cases must arise. The first is that for some 
max vertex i, (i, j) and (i, k) are edges of G but v(i) > v(k) and v(i) > v(j). 
We construct a vector 6’ = (v’(l), . . . . v’(n)) such that 6’ satisfies the 
constraints of the linear programming problem and C v’(i) < C v(i), 
contradicting the fact that vector V is an optimal solution to the linear 
programming problem. Let v’(l) = v(l) for I# i and let v’(l) = max(v( j), v(k)). 
It is straightforward to verify that 6 satisfies the constraints of the linear 
programming problem and since v’(i) < u(i), C;= 1 v’(l) < C;= 1 v(l), which 
proves the contradiction. The other case is that for some average vertex i, 
(i, j) and (i, k) are edges of G but v(i) > i(v( j) + u(k)). A similar argument 
to the first case shows that this leads to a contradiction. Hence the optimal 
solution to the linear programming problem must be the unique solution 
of the SSG G. 
Khachiyan (1979) has shown that the linear programming problem is 
computable in time polynomial in the length of the input, which is polyno- 
mial in n in this case, completing the proof for the max and average case. 
The proof for case (2), where G has just min and average vertices, is very 
similar to the proof of (1). In this case, the linear programming problem is 
to maximize C;=, v(l), subject to the constraints 
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o(i) < u(j) if i is a min vertex and (i, j) E E 
u(i) < i(u(j, + o(k) if i is an average vertex and (i, j), (i, k) E E 
u(i) = 0, if i=n-1 
u(i) = 1, if i=n. 
Finally, we consider case (3), where there are just max and min vertices. 
In this case, the following algorithm correctly computes the value of every 
node of G in polynomial time. The algorithm maintains two sets of vertices, 
U and D. D is the set of vertices whose values have already been deter- 
mined by the algorithm and U is the set of vertices whose values are still 
undetermined. Initially D = {n - 1, n}, where the values v(n - 1) and o(n) 
are 0 and 1, respectively, since these are the sink vertices, and U = V-D. 
Throughout the algorithm, D u U= V. After the initialization step, the 
algorithm consists of the following loop: 
repeat 
for all vertices i in U do 
if i is a max vertex with a l-valued child in D then 
move i to D and define u(i) to be 1; 
if i is a max vertex with two O-valued children in D then 
move i to D and define u(i) to be 0; 
if i is a min vertex with a O-valued child in D then 
move i to D and define u(i) to be 0; 
if i is a min vertex with two l-valued children in D then 
move i to D and define u(i) to be 1 
endfor 
until no vertices are moved from U to D in the loop 
for all vertices i in U do 
define u(i) to be 0. 
The number of executions of the repeat loop is bounded by 1 VI since on 
every iteration of the repeat loop except the last, at least one vertex is 
moved from U to D. From this it is clear that the algorithm runs in 
polynomial time. 
We next explain why the algorithm correctly computes the values of the 
vertices. Given a SSG G as input, let Dfina, and Ufina, be the sets U and D 
when the repeat loop of the algorithm is exited. It is straightforward to 
show that any vertex i in Dfinal has the correct value, by induction on the 
number of times the repeat loop is executed before i is moved to D. 
Suppose vertex i is in Ufinal. To show that the algorithm is correct, we 
need to show that 
max min 0, ,(i) = 0. 
Ll i ’ 
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Let r be the following strategy. If i is a min vertex in Denal and both of its 
children have value 1, choose one child j arbitrarily and let r contain the 
edge (i, j). Otherwise one of its children has value 0; choose a child j of i 
with value 0 and let r contain the edge (i, j). If i is a min vertex in Ufinal, 
then one of its children, say j, is also in Ufinal. Otherwise i would have been 
moved from U to D at some iteration of the repeat loop. Again, let z 
contain the edge (i, j). Now, let r~ be any strategy of player 1. We show 
that u,,,(i) = 0. 
To do this, it is sufficient to show that there is no path from i to the 
l-sink in G,,.. Since there are no average vertices in G, the edges of G,,, 
are exactly the edges in (T u r. Suppose there is a path from i to the l-sink. 
Then there must be a path from i to a vertex in DEnal with value 1. This 
implies that there must be an edge of 0 u r from some vertex in Ufina, to a 
vertex in DAna, with value 1. But there is no edge from a max vertex of Vana, 
to a vertex in Dfina, with value 1; otherwise i would have been moved from 
U to D on some iteration of the repeat loop. Also, there are no edges in 
r from a min vertex of Ufina, to a vertex of Dfina, with value 1, by definition 
of r. This contradicts the assumption that there is a path from i to the 
l-sink in G,. I ; hence u(i)=O. m 
3.1. Relationship between Stochastic Games and Complexity Classes 
Our motivation for studying the SSG problem stems from a study of 
probabilistic complexity classes. The realization that a source of random 
bits can be useful in finding solutions to problems has motivated the study 
of probabilistic algorithms and models of computation. Recently, random- 
ness has been added to nondeterministic and alternating machines in novel 
ways, giving rise to various “game-like” complexity classes. One example is 
the games against nature of Papadimitriou (1985), a model that combines 
the features of nondeterministic and probabilistic Turing machines (Gill, 
1977). We briefly describe games against nature and some problems that 
they naturally model, and then show that the SSG problem with just max 
and average vertices is complete for the class of languages accepted by log 
space bounded games against nature. Finally, we show that the more 
general SSG value problem with max, min, and average vertices is com- 
plete for the class of languages accepted by log space bounded randomized 
alternating Turing machines. 
Roughly, a game against nature is a special kind of nondeterministic 
Turing machine, whose states are partitioned into existential (3) and ran- 
dom states. Without loss of generality, we assume that the Turing machine 
has exactly two choices at every step, except when a final state (accepting 
or rejecting) is reached, in which case the Turing machine halts. The nodes 
of a computation tree of such a machine on a fixed input are naturally 
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partitioned into existential and random nodes, depending on whether the state 
of the configuration labeling the node is existential or random, respectively. 
Let M be a game against nature and let T be the computation tree of M 
on input x. Define an 3subtree T’ to be any subtree of T, with the same 
root as T, where every internal existential node has exactly one child. The 
input x is accepted by M if and only if there is some 3subtree T’ such that 
the probability of reaching an accepting leaf is > &, when a path is followed 
randomly from the root of T’ by choosing each child of a random node 
with probability 4. Time and space bounded games against nature can be 
defined just as are time and space bounded nondeterministic or 
probabilistic Turing machines. 
Polynomial time bounded games against nature model a certain class of 
problems in optimization, called decision problems under uncertainty. An 
example of such a problem is the stochastic scheduling problem, described 
by Papadimitriou (1985). Suppose t tasks are to be scheduled on m 
processors to minimize the total tirne to execute all the tasks. There are 
precedence constraints among the tasks and the execution times of the 
tasks are random variables. The scheduling process can be thought of as a 
game against nature where player 1, modeling the scheduler, chooses the 
best set of tasks to schedule and player 0, modeling nature, randomly 
chooses which job will halt first. This problem is naturally modeled by a 
time bounded game against nature because the game between the scheduler 
and nature ends as soon as all jobs are completed. Papadimitriou used the 
model of a polynomial time bounded game against nature to show that the 
stochastic scheduling problem and similar decision problems under 
uncertainty are complete for PSPACE. 
Other optimization problems, where long-term costs are to be optimized, 
can be modeled by space bounded games against nature. Derman (1972) 
describes an example of an inventory system for a given product where the 
inventory is under periodic review. After each review, a decision is made to 
add a certain amount of the product to the intentory level. The goal is to 
optimize a cost function that depends on factors such as the cost of holding 
the inventory in storage or the cost of shortages caused by random fluctua- 
tions in demand. A criterion for optimality would normally be a function 
of long-term costs. 
Denote the class of log space bounded games against nature by GAN- 
SPACE(log(n)). Condon (1989) showed that the SSG value problem, 
with just max and average vertices, is complete for the class GAN- 
SPACE(log(n)). To see this, note that a game against nature can simulate 
a play of a SSG G using only log space, by following the edges of G, 
choosing an edge existentially from max vertices and randomly from 
average vertices. From this it follows that the SSG-value problem with max 
and average vertices is in GAN-SPACE(log(n)). The problem is complete 
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for GAN-SPACE(log(n)), with respect to determinstic log space reduc- 
tions, because a space bounded game against nature M on a fixed input x 
can be represented by a SSG in the following way. The vertices of the SSG 
are labeled by configurations of M on x and the edges represent one-step 
transitions between configurations. If a vertex is labeled by a configuration 
with a random state, it is an average vertex, otherwise it is a max vertex. 
The vertices labeled by the initial, accept, and rejecting configurations 
are the start, the l-sink, and the O-sink vertices, respectively. The SSG 
constructed in this way has value > i if and only if the game against nature 
M acepts the fixed input x. Moreover, given a description of A4, it is 
straightforward to construct the SSG for an input x in space @log 1x1). 
Just as randomness can be added to nondeterministic machines to obtain 
games against nature, randomness can also be added to the alternating 
Turing machines of Chandra, Kozen, and Stockmeyer (1981) to obtain 
randomized alternating Turing machines. Randomized alternating Turing 
machines generalize games against nature in the following way: the states 
are partitioned into three types. existential (3), universal (V), and random. 
Let T be the computation tree of a randomized alternating Turing machine 
on input x. An 3-subtree T’ of T is defined just as before. We further define 
a V-subtree T” to be a subtree of T’ with the same root as T’, where every 
internal universal node has exactly one child. The input x is accepted by M 
if there is some 3subtree T’ such that for all V-subtrees T” of T’, the 
probability of reaching an accepting leaf of T” is > $, when a path is 
followed randomly from the root of T”. In (Condon, 1989), we denote the 
class of languages accepted by log space bounded randomized alternating 
Turing machines by AUC-SPACE(log(n)). The SSG value problem is log 
space complete for the class AUC-SPACE(log(n)). The proof of this is a 
straightforward generalization of the proof that the SSG problem with just 
max and average vertices is complete for GAN-SPACE(log(n)). 
4. EXTENSIONS AND OPEN PROBLEMS 
There are many ways to generalize simple stochastic games. We describe 
some of these generalizations in this section and consider whether the 
results of the previous sections extend to these generalized classes of 
stochastic games. 
A natural generalization is to allow more than two edges from a vertex 
and to allow edges from average vertices to be labeled with arbitrary 
rational probabilities, such that the probabilities from each average vertex 
sum to 1. Suppose G is a stochastic game with n vertices generalized in this 
way such that all edges from average vertices of G are labeled with 
probabilities of the form p/q, where 0 <p < q d 2”. Then, as we outline 
643!96.‘?-7 
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next, in time polynomial in max{m, n}, G can be transformed to a SSG G’ 
such that the value of G equals the value of G’. Hence the value problem 
for these stochastic games is also in NP n co-NP. 
Briefly, G’ can be constructed from G in two stages. In the first stage, the 
out degree of every vertex is reduced to two by replacing each vertex with 
fan-out Z, where I> 2, by a binary tree with 1 leaves, and relabeling the 
edges with the appropriate probabilities. In the second stage, if i is a vertex 
with two children j and k and edges labeled with probabilities p,/q, pJq, 
where 2’ < q < 2’+ I, then i is replaced by a complete binary tree of average 
vertices of depth t + 1, rooted at i. All outgoing edges of p, of the leaves 
of this tree point to j; all outgoing edges of pz of the leaves of this tree 
point to t; and the remaining leaves point to i, the root of the tree. This 
construction guarantees that the probabilities of reaching j and k from i are 
exactly p, /q and pJq, respectively. 
Another generalization, standard in the literature on stochastic games, is 
to allow payoffs at the vertices. Simple stochastic games with payoffs were 
studied by Filar (1981). Suppose that each vertex of a stochastic game is 
labeled with a rational number, called its payoff. Let the payoff associated 
with vertex i be denoted by ai (the payoffs can be negative). Assume that 
the payoffs are of the form p/q, where 1 dp, q < 2”. The interpretation of 
the payoff in the game is that whenever the token is placed on vertex i, 
player 0 must pay amount ai to player 1. In such games, the value of a 
game may not be well-defined in general. Hence we only consider stopping 
games, where the expected total winnings of either player on any play of 
the game are finite. That is, we assume that there is one special sink vertex 
with payoff 0 and that for all pairs of strategies of the players, this vertex 
.is eventually reached with probability 1 on any play of the game. 
Let G be a simple stochastic game with payoffs, such that G is a stopping 
game. For a fixed Fair of strategies (T and r of the players, the value of the 
vertices of G with respect to 0 and T is the unique solution to the equation 
Go, T = QC,, I + ti, where a is the vector of payoffs of the vertices and Q is the 
l-step transition matrix of the graph G,, r, excluding the special sink vertex. 
Lemmas 4-6 of Section 2.1 generalize to show that there is a pair of 
optimal pure strategies r~‘, z’ of players 1 and 0, respectively, such that for 
all vertices 1, 
mm rnfx u,, .(I) = u,,,,,(f) = m;x mm v,, ,(I). 
Also the definitions of an iteration function and a solution, given in 
Section 3, generalize to SSGs with payoffs. Thus the results of Section 3 can 
be extended to show that the value problem for stopping SSGs with payoffs 
is in NP n co-NP. 
The last generalization we consider was introduced by Shapley (1953) in 
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his original paper on stochastic games. In this model, the players move 
simultaneously at each step of the game. The vertices of the graph are parti- 
tioned into two groups, which we call the average and the strategic vertices. 
We assume that there are four edges from each strategic vertex, each 
labeled by a tuple (b,, b l ), where b,, b, E (0, 1). In playing the game, when 
the token is placed on a strategic vertex, players 0 and 1 simultaneously 
choose binary values for bits 6, and b,, respectively. The pair of bits 
chosen determines to which neighbor the token is moved. 
Because of the simultaneity in this model, in order for the minimax result 
(Lemma 6) to hold, it is necessary to generalize the definition of a strategy 
of a player. A mixed (or probabilistic) strategy of player 0 is a set of pairs 
(poi, pIi), one per strategic vertex i, such that poi+pli= 1. The interpreta- 
tion of this strategy is that when the token is on vertex i, player 0 chooses 
value 0 for b,, with probability poi and value 1 for 6, with probability pli. 
A mixed strategy of player 1 is defined similarly. With this definition of 
strategy, the results of Section 2 extend to simultaneous stochastic games 
(see Shapley, 1953). However, it is an open problem whether the value 
problem for simultaneous stochastic games is in NP n co-NP. One obstacle 
to solving this is that the value of a simultaneous stochastic game need not 
be rational-see (Peters and Vrieze, 1987) for an example of this. 
Finally, a challenging open problem is whether the SSG value is in P. 
A related problem which might be of significance in solving this is the 
following. Is there a polynomial time algorithm that separates graphs with 
high value from those with low value? More precisely, let A be the set of 
SSGs that have value > a and let B be the set of SSGs that have value <a. 
Then it would be of interest to find a polynomial time decision algorithm 
A4 that, on input G E A u B, accepts if and only if GE A. 
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